Brainograph.Utilities
6.62.0
dotnet add package Brainograph.Utilities --version 6.62.0
NuGet\Install-Package Brainograph.Utilities -Version 6.62.0
<PackageReference Include="Brainograph.Utilities" Version="6.62.0" />
<PackageVersion Include="Brainograph.Utilities" Version="6.62.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Brainograph.Utilities" />
paket add Brainograph.Utilities --version 6.62.0
#r "nuget: Brainograph.Utilities, 6.62.0"
#:package Brainograph.Utilities@6.62.0
#addin nuget:?package=Brainograph.Utilities&version=6.62.0
#tool nuget:?package=Brainograph.Utilities&version=6.62.0
Brainograph shared kernel (rewrite, v2): frozen platform wire contracts (response envelope, DataProvider models/executor, entity bases, permission/role enums), JWT authentication, the exception-to-envelope map, and the envelope-typed BaseApiClient.
| Product | Versions Compatible and additional computed target framework versions. |
|---|---|
| .NET | net10.0 is compatible. net10.0-android was computed. net10.0-browser was computed. net10.0-ios was computed. net10.0-maccatalyst was computed. net10.0-macos was computed. net10.0-tvos was computed. net10.0-windows was computed. |
-
net10.0
- Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.Extensions.Http (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.Extensions.Logging (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions (>= 10.0.5)
- Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect (>= 8.16.0)
- Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens (>= 8.16.0)
- Newtonsoft.Json (>= 13.0.4)
- System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt (>= 8.16.0)
NuGet packages
This package is not used by any NuGet packages.
GitHub repositories
This package is not used by any popular GitHub repositories.
6.62.0 — ADDITIVE (BG-1317, for the automatic knowledge refresh of BG-125): THREE new service scopes, no new audience. ServiceScopes.ContentKnowledgeGraphSourceRead = content.knowledgegraph.source.read, audience https://content.api/: bg-knowledgegraph (svc-knowledgegraph) reads immutable article source revisions and the article census from bg-content; one route under it, POST censuses, writes a frozen listing into bg-content's own bookkeeping and changes no article; bg-knowledgegraph requests the scope alone, the issuer does not enforce that (open review point). ServiceScopes.MediaKnowledgeGraphSourceRead = media.knowledgegraph.source.read, audience https://media.api/: the same caller reads versioned image sources and their bytes from bg-media, read-only. ServiceScopes.KnowledgeGraphVisibilityRead = knowledgegraph.visibility.read, audience https://knowledgegraph.api/: DECLARED ONLY, no route uses it and nobody holds it. No acting user on any of them. Owner 2026-11-12, answered: «Այո, հաստատում եմ», and after being told of the census write: «Այո, ուժի մեջ է» (ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-11-12). No other change. 6.61.0 — ADDITIVE (BG-1915): ONE new service scope, ServiceScopes.AiAgentQuizSetCut = aiagent.quizset.cut, audience https://aiagent.api/ (bg-aiagent is already a receiver, no new audience), a WRITE scope on aiagent's own data, requested ALONE, held by svc-usercontent alone: usercontent asks bg-aiagent to cut an immutable quiz set for an AI-quiz slide (POST api/quiz-sets) with its OWN service token naming the acting user (the author, or the viewer on a lazy pin); the receiver must require an acting user. Owner 2026-11-11, typed: «одобряю право aiagent.quizset.cut» (ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-11-11). No other change. 6.60.0 — ADDITIVE (BG-1751, redesign): ONE new service scope, ServiceScopes.IdentityMailSendAsUser = identity.mail.sendasuser, audience https://identity.api/, a WRITE scope held by svc-usercontent alone: usercontent asks bg-identity to send a co-working e-mail (direct invitation, delete request) to recipients by user id; the ACTING USER of the token is the sender; bg-identity resolves names, addresses and languages itself and sends through its existing notification path, so no address leaves bg-identity (owner 2026-11-05, typed: «одобряю право identity.mail.sendasuser»; ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-11-05 b). The 6.57.0 scopes notification.email.sendasuser and identity.usercontact.read stay DECLARED but are superseded and granted to nobody. No ApplicationAdminPermission change. PREVIOUSLY, 6.59.0 — ADDITIVE (BG-1610 AC-4): ONE new service scope, ServiceScopes.IdentityFeaturesRead = identity.features.read, audience https://identity.api/, read-only, one user per call, held by svc-usercontent alone (owner 2026-11-05, typed: «Հաստատում եմ»; ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-11-05). NEW namespace Brainograph.Utilities.Features: IFeatureReleaseClient/FeatureReleaseClient asks bg-identity GET api/features/users/{userId} with its own token requested for that scope ALONE; per-user cache 30 s by default, 60 s at most; a failure is never cached. AddFeatureRelease(configuration) binds section FeatureRelease. [RequireFeature("key")] is an authorization filter (before model binding): FAILS CLOSED on every failure (identity unreachable/slow/refusing, malformed answer, no token, section unset, no client) with HTTP 403 and the new CommonErrorCodes.FeatureNotReleased = common.feature.notReleased (params.feature); no role bypasses it, SuperAdmin included; a service principal is asked about its acting user and one naming nobody is refused; anonymous is 401. No ApplicationAdminPermission change. PREVIOUSLY, 6.58.0 — ADDITIVE: ONE new ApplicationAdminPermission member, 249 ManageFeatureFlags (BG-1610: release-stage feature flags and audience groups in bg-identity; owner decision 2026-11-04, BG-1608). It gates the bg-identity flag/group admin routes only; what a user sees is evaluated per user by GET api/features/me, and the dev stage stays closed in production regardless of this grant. APPENDED AT THE END as the freeze contract requires (ordinals 1-248 unchanged); ApplicationAdminPermissionFreezeTests was taken RED first (2 of 2) and the committed catalogue is REGENERATED. No role holds it by default; SuperAdmin passes without a grant (6.17.0); existing principals receive no personal grant because the enum grew. Consumers re-pin to 6.58.0. PREVIOUSLY, 6.57.0 — ADDITIVE: two new service scopes for BG-1751 (co-working e-mails; owner 2026-11-04, typed: «да, одобряю права notification.email.sendasuser и identity.usercontact.read»). ServiceScopes.NotificationEmailSendAsUser = notification.email.sendasuser, audience https://notification.api/ (a NEW receiver audience): usercontent sends one e-mail to one user by id on behalf of the acting user; e-mail only, not SMS; held by svc-usercontent alone. ServiceScopes.IdentityUserContactRead = identity.usercontact.read, audience https://identity.api/: notification reads one user's e-mail, display name and registration language; read-only, one user per call; held by svc-notification alone. No ApplicationAdminPermission change. See ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-11-04.
6.56.0 — ADDITIVE: ONE new ApplicationAdminPermission member, 248, UseCalendar (BG-1743, the bg-usercontent personal calendar; owner 2026-11-03: opened first to a chosen circle, later to everyone, so no role holds it by default). Appended, so ordinals 1-247 are unchanged; ApplicationAdminPermissionFreezeTests was taken RED first (2 of 2: the count and the name/value collection); the committed catalogue is regenerated. No behaviour change in this package: bg-usercontent starts requiring it only after its own re-pin and its calendar/* routes, bg-identity grants it to SuperAdmin and SuperModerator (which hold every member) and to no other role; admins grant it to a person. Existing principals receive no personal grant because the enum grew. SuperAdmin passes every [HasPermission] without a grant (6.17.0). Consumers re-pin only when they use the member. PREVIOUSLY, 6.55.0 — ADDITIVE: ONE new service scope, ServiceScopes.MediaAudioWriteAsUser = "media.audio.writeasuser" (audience https://media.api/), in ServiceScopes.All and AudienceFor (BG-1649 text-to-voice: bg-aiagent stores generated audio in bg-media on behalf of the acting user; ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-11-02, owner). ServiceScopeAudienceTests was taken RED first (1 of 649). No behaviour change in this package: bg-media admits the scope only after its own re-pin and route, and bg-identity grants it to svc-aiagent separately. PREVIOUSLY, 6.54.0 — ADDITIVE: TWO new ApplicationAdminPermission members, 246-247, ManageCollabSettings / ViewCollabJournal (BG-1556 T11, the admin side of presentation co-working: the limits settings and the audited journal view). They take the next free ordinals after 6.53.0 used 244-245, so the dev-kit ADR's 244/245 are superseded. Appended, so ordinals 1-245 are unchanged; ApplicationAdminPermissionFreezeTests was taken RED first (2 of 2: the count and the name/value collection); the committed catalogue is regenerated. No behaviour change in this package: bg-usercontent starts requiring them only after its own re-pin, and bg-identity grants them to SuperAdmin and SuperModerator (which hold every member) before that. Existing principals receive no personal grant because the enum grew. SuperAdmin passes every [HasPermission] without a grant (6.17.0). Consumers re-pin only when they use the members. PREVIOUSLY, 6.53.0 — ADDITIVE: TWO new ApplicationAdminPermission members, 244-245, ViewFeedbackSuggestions / TriageFeedbackSuggestions (BG-112 AC-3: the bg-feedback suggestions inbox was gated by an admin role alone). Appended, so ordinals 1-243 are unchanged; the committed permission catalogue is regenerated. No behaviour change in this package: bg-feedback starts requiring them only after its own re-pin, and bg-identity grants them to the admin roles (seed plus a backfill for existing holders) BEFORE that. Existing principals receive no personal grant because the enum grew. SuperAdmin passes every [HasPermission] without a grant (6.17.0).
6.52.0 — ADDITIVE: one service scope (GEN-ADR-1, BG-1560, the co-working invitations). New: ServiceScopes.IdentityUserDirectoryRead = "identity.userdirectory.read", audience https://identity.api/ (READ-ONLY; bg-usercontent finds ONE user by exact e-mail or phone and reads display names of known ids; id, display name and avatar only, never e-mail or phone). Owner, 2026-10-29 15:40 CST, typed in the performing session's window (dev 2): «Q1 да, один scope; Q2 да». No audience is added; no behaviour change for any scope declared earlier. A client holds the scope only once bg-identity grants it (svc-usercontent; a separate additive change).
6.51.0 — ADDITIVE: two service scopes and one receiver audience (GEN-ADR-1, BG-1518). New: ServiceScopes.IdentityLearningDimensionsRead = "identity.learningdimensions.read", audience https://identity.api/ (READ-ONLY; bg-aiagent reads one learner's dimension ids - country, region, school, grade, user type; no names, no birth year). ServiceScopes.AnalyticLearningIngest = "analytic.learning.ingest", audience https://analytic.api/ (a WRITE scope; bg-aiagent delivers anonymous learning deltas, no user id). ServiceTokens startup now accepts the analytic audience; before, ServiceTokens:Audience https://analytic.api/ was refused as "not a service audience". Owner, 2026-10-29 ~06:49Z, typed in the performing session's window: «да, оба scope: identity.learningdimensions.read и analytic.learning.ingest для svc-aiagent» (ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-10-29). No behaviour change for any scope declared earlier. A client holds a scope only once bg-identity grants it. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (a new authorization surface).
6.50.0 — BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (BG-1442): BaseApiClient no longer copies the inbound request's Authorization header onto the outbound call; services talk with service tokens, never a forwarded user bearer (owner rule 2026-09-27). A client now sends no credential until its subclass supplies one (ApplyServiceAuthorizationAsync or its own header). The 6.49.0 constructor flag forwardInboundAuthorization stays: false (what the five known clients pass) is unchanged; true now throws ArgumentException instead of being ignored. A consumer that took 6.49.0 or earlier AND relied on the copy (the fleet census found only usercontent's invite mailer, since removed) loses its Authorization on this version.
6.49.0 — ADDITIVE: BaseApiClient can be told NOT to forward the inbound bearer (BG-1442). New protected constructor BaseApiClient(IHttpClientFactory, IHttpContextAccessor, ILoggerFactory?, bool forwardInboundAuthorization); false copies no Authorization header from the ambient request. The default is UNCHANGED (true): the three existing constructors behave exactly as before, so no consumer changes behaviour by taking this version. A later release flips the default once nothing relies on the copy.
6.48.0 — ADDITIVE: one service scope and one receiver audience for bg-media (GEN-ADR-1, BG-1412). New: ServiceScopes.MediaContentUrlRead = "media.content.url.read", audience https://media.api/ (READ-ONLY; bg-feedback resolves the delivery URL of a reporter's private screenshot with its own service token instead of forwarding the staff user's bearer). The acting user in the token is the asset's OWNER (the reporter), not the person who clicked; the receiver admits only when the asset's OwnerId equals it. ServiceTokens startup now accepts the media audience; before, ServiceTokens:Audience https://media.api/ was refused as "not a service audience". Owner, 2026-10-26 05:55:25Z, typed in the performing session's window: «А» (ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-10-26, second). No behaviour change for any scope declared earlier. A client holds it only once bg-identity grants it. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (a new authorization surface).
6.47.0 — ADDITIVE: one service scope and one receiver audience for bg-aiagent (GEN-ADR-1, BG-1410). New: ServiceScopes.AiAgentIntakeClassify = "aiagent.intake.classify", audience https://aiagent.api/ (NOT a write scope; bg-feedback asks the intake classifier with its own service token naming the acting user and the request, instead of forwarding the end user's bearer). ServiceTokens startup now accepts the aiagent audience; before, ServiceTokens:Audience https://aiagent.api/ was refused as "not a service audience". Owner, 2026-10-26 04:10Z, typed in the performing session's window: «Хорошо, я согласен с твоим советом, делай так» (ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-10-26). No behaviour change for any scope declared earlier. A client holds it only once bg-identity grants it. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (a new authorization surface).
6.46.0 — ADDITIVE, OFF BY DEFAULT: session revocation (BG-1338). SessionRevocation:Enabled (default false) polls bg-identity (GET api/Session/Ended, a SERVICE token, every 5 s) and refuses a user token issued at or before its owner's sessions ended: 401, error_description=session_ended (code auth.session.ended). Also ServiceScopes.IdentitySessionsRead = "identity.sessions.read", audience https://identity.api/ (READ-ONLY; owner typed yes 2026-10-23). Disabled the registration is exactly the 6.45.0 one. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone.
6.45.0 — ADDITIVE: one service scope and one receiver audience for bg-identity (GEN-ADR-1). New: ServiceScopes.IdentitySchoolUserStatsRead = "identity.schooluserstats.read", audience https://identity.api/ (READ-ONLY, counts only; bg-dictionary reads the school-user aggregate with it instead of forwarding the admin's bearer, bg-dictionary#21). ServiceTokens startup now accepts the identity audience; before, ServiceTokens:Audience https://identity.api/ was refused as "not a service audience". Owner, 2026-10-14 17:41 CST, typed in the performing session's window: «да» (ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-10-14, third). No behaviour change for any scope declared earlier. An endpoint uses the scope by declaring [AllowServiceScope]; a client holds it only once bg-identity grants it (the svc-dictionary client is a separate, additive change). Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (a new authorization surface).
6.44.0 — BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (mechanism, no new right): an action may declare MORE THAN ONE [AllowServiceScope] and admission is ANY-OF (GEN-ADR-1; owner rule 2026-10-05 'every endpoint accepts a service token'; coordinator decision 2026-10-14). AllowServiceScopeAttribute is now repeatable: a service token is admitted when it holds ANY declared scope that belongs to this receiver's audience; a declared scope of another receiver's audience admits nothing; with ONE attribute behaviour is exactly as before. New: ClaimsPrincipal.HasServiceScope(scope) (the service-authenticated token HOLDS the scope) and HttpContext.WasAdmittedUnderServiceScope(scope) (the call was admitted under it: the matched endpoint declares it, it belongs to this audience, the token holds it) - a receiver that branches on what a caller may see uses the second. The user-gate bypass (a scope on a [HasPermission] or role-gated action replaces that gate for its holder, since 6.27.0) applies to every declared scope alike. WHAT A RE-PIN CARRIES: the attribute is inherited and repeatable, so a derived override's attribute is ADDED to the base action's where it used to REPLACE it (no consumer overrides an action today; one that does must restate the scopes it means). A consumer test that reads the attribute with GetMetadata (single) silently picks the last of several; read them with GetOrderedMetadata. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (an authentication surface).
6.43.0 — ADDITIVE: two WRITE service scopes for acting-user writes (GEN-ADR-1, ADR 0002 Amendment 2026-10-14; bg-shared#27). New: ServiceScopes.ContentWriteAsUser = "content.writeasuser" (audience https://content.api/) and ServiceScopes.UserContentWriteAsUser = "usercontent.writeasuser" (audience https://usercontent.api/); both are in the known-scope list and in the scope-to-audience table, so [AllowServiceScope] with either is admitted by the kernel on the right host. Write scopes: requested ALONE. A receiver that declares one is expected to take the owner from GetActingUserId() and to refuse a call without it; the kernel enforces neither. No behaviour change for any scope declared earlier or for any receiver that does not declare these. A client holds a scope only once bg-identity registers and grants it (a separate change). Names confirmed by the owner 2026-10-14 (relayed through the coordinator); the ADR matrix row is a separate amendment. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (a new authorization surface).
6.42.0 — ADDITIVE: the acting user and the request id on a SERVICE token (GEN-ADR-1, ADR 0002 Amendments 2026-09-28 and 2026-10-14; bg-shared#27). New: ServiceTokenClaims.ActingUser = "bg_acting_user" and ServiceTokenClaims.RequestId = "bg_request_id"; ClaimsPrincipal.GetActingUserId() / GetRequestId(), which answer ONLY for a principal the SERVICE handler authenticated (a user token carrying the same claim names yields null); ActingServiceTokenProvider (one token per acting user and request, bounded cache, single-flight, ArgumentException before any request on a malformed context) and AddActingServiceTokenProvider (singleton). Behaviour change on the receiving side: a service token with a duplicated, malformed or half-stated acting context (an acting user without a request id) is now REFUSED; a token without the claims is unchanged. The claims are ATTRIBUTION ONLY (owner, B3): they add no authority, and the refusal of sid, roles, permissions and job claims is unchanged. bg-identity does not stamp them yet (its per-client right and the mint are a separate change), so no token carries them until then. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (an authentication surface).
6.41.0 — ADDITIVE: one service scope for bg-gis -> bg-content (GEN-ADR-1). New: ServiceScopes.ContentBaseMapUsageRead = "content.basemap.usage.read", audience https://content.api/ (the audience content already has; READ-ONLY, COUNTS only: bg-gis asks who uses a base map - lessons and education folders - before it trashes or purges one, G5-extra). Owner, 2026-10-06 15:53 CST, typed: «да, разрешаю G5-extra: правку ADR 0002 и GEN-AUTH.md» (ADR 0002 and dev-kit GEN-AUTH.md carry the row). No behaviour change for any scope declared earlier. A client holds the scope only once bg-identity grants it (the svc-gis client is a separate, additive change); a receiver uses it by declaring [AllowServiceScope] on the usage action only. Adopt by a pin move; ships alone (a new authorization surface).
6.40.0 — ADDITIVE: one service scope and one receiver audience for bg-dictionary (GEN-ADR-1). New: ServiceScopes.DictionarySubjectSettingRead = "dictionary.subjectsetting.read", audience https://dictionary.api/ (READ-ONLY; bg-content#103 reads the main base map of a subject with it). ServiceTokens startup now accepts the dictionary audience; before, ServiceTokens:Audience https://dictionary.api/ was refused as "not a service audience". Owner, 2026-10-06 13:25 CST, typed: «Да, разрешаю правку ADR 0002 и GEN-AUTH.md» (ADR 0002 and dev-kit GEN-AUTH.md carry the row). No behaviour change for any scope declared before this version; an endpoint uses the scope by declaring [AllowServiceScope], and a client holds it only once bg-identity grants it.
6.39.0 — BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (authorization), no new members: EraseUser LEAVES ExcludedForSuperModerator (owner, 2026-10-06, bg-identity#120: a SuperModerator may erase accounts, except a SuperAdmin or another SuperModerator - that target check is bg-identity’s, read from the database, not this gate). ExcludedForSuperModerator is back to CreateSuperAdminUser, UpdateSuperAdminUser, DeleteSuperAdminUser; a SuperModerator passes a [HasPermission] gate accepting ONLY EraseUser again. Everything else is unchanged from 6.38.0. Consumers must read docs/CHANGELOG.md 6.39.0 before re-pinning.
6.38.0 — BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (authorization), no new members: EraseUser joins ExcludedForSuperModerator (owner, 2026-10-05 17:35: erasing an account is SuperAdmin-only). A SuperModerator no longer passes a [HasPermission] gate accepting ONLY CreateSuperAdminUser, UpdateSuperAdminUser, DeleteSuperAdminUser or EraseUser; everything else is unchanged from 6.37.0. Consumers must read docs/CHANGELOG.md 6.38.0 before re-pinning.
6.37.0 — BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (authorization), no new members: SuperModerator passes every [HasPermission] gate except one whose accepted permissions are ONLY CreateSuperAdminUser, UpdateSuperAdminUser, DeleteSuperAdminUser (owner, 2026-10-05), future members included, with no personal grant. New public PermissionGate (Brainograph.Utilities.Authentication): ExcludedForSuperModerator, RoleBypasses, HasPermissionOrRoleBypass - the one rule the filter and every consumer in-action check should call. SuperAdmin unchanged (passes everything). Consumers must read docs/CHANGELOG.md 6.37.0 before re-pinning.
6.36.0 — ADDITIVE: FOUR new ApplicationAdminPermission members, 240-243, ReadAiQuiz / UpdateAiQuiz / PublishAiQuiz / DeleteAiQuiz (bg-aiagent#72, the admin side of AI-generated quizzes: versions, review, approval before learners see a quiz). APPENDED AT THE END as the freeze contract requires (ordinals 1-239 unchanged; the ordinal IS the bit position in the compact perms claim); ApplicationAdminPermissionFreezeTests was taken RED first. Publish is its own grant, separate from Update. NOT a gate on generation: generation stays open to anyone with a quota, and no UseAi* member is enforced on the quiz routes (the comment that said UseAiTeachingTools gates generation was wrong and is corrected). ALSO: the four FolderLabel members 209-212 are marked [Obsolete] (a warning; bg-content#157, folder labels are removed) and keep their ordinals; a service that still names one in code gets CS0618, an error under TreatWarningsAsErrors, so it re-pins only after it stops naming them. Existing principals receive no personal grant because the enum grew — admins grant them (owner, 2026-10-05); SuperAdmin passes without one. Consumers re-pin to 6.36.0. PREVIOUSLY, 6.35.0 — BEHAVIOUR: a request ABORTED BY THE CLIENT (HttpContext.RequestAborted cancelled, response not started) is answered 499 with no body and logged ONCE at Information (method and path, no stack) by ExceptionHandlingMiddleware, instead of 500 + Error + Sentry. An OperationCanceledException from an outbound timeout or the service's own token still maps to 500 + Error, unchanged. Amends ERROR-HANDLING section 1 (ratified 2026-07-09) on the owner's typed yes, 2026-10-05: «да, 499». No API surface changed; consumers re-pin to 6.35.0. PREVIOUSLY, 6.34.0 — ADDITIVE: SIX new ApplicationAdminPermission members, 234-239, ReadAuthoredQuiz / CreateAuthoredQuiz / UpdateAuthoredQuiz / DeleteAuthoredQuiz / RestoreAuthoredQuiz / PurgeAuthoredQuiz (bg-content#150, authored quizzes: embed codes with a title per language, shared by lessons and education folders). NOT the AI quizzes of bg-aiagent (UseAiTeachingTools). APPENDED AT THE END as the freeze contract requires: ApplicationAdminPermissionFreezeTests was taken RED first (2 of 2: the count and the name/value collection) and green only after the append; the committed catalogue is REGENERATED, not edited. Learners read Published quizzes through an [Authorize] route that needs no member. Consumers re-pin to 6.34.0; existing principals receive no personal grant from the enum growing - admins grant them (owner rule), and bg-identity adds only the role-map entries. Nothing existing changed. PREVIOUSLY, 6.33.0 — ADDITIVE: TWO new ApplicationAdminPermission members, 232 RestoreUser and 233 EraseUser (bg-identity#113, recoverable account deletion). RestoreUser reverses an administrator soft delete; EraseUser is the irreversible erasure of an already soft-deleted account. APPENDED AT THE END as the freeze contract requires: ApplicationAdminPermissionFreezeTests was taken RED first (2 of 2: the count and the name/value collection) and green only after the append; the committed catalogue is REGENERATED, not edited. Shared owns the names and ordinals; bg-identity owns the default-role distribution. Consumers re-pin to 6.33.0; existing principals receive no personal grant from the enum growing - admins grant them (owner rule). Nothing existing changed. PREVIOUSLY, 6.32.0 — ADDITIVE: TWO new ApplicationAdminPermission members, 230 RestorePresentation and 231 PurgePresentation (bg-usercontent#53). They keep reversible recovery and delete-forever separate from DeletePresentation. Owner decision 2026-09-29: ContentManager receives RestorePresentation but NOT PurgePresentation; SuperAdmin and SuperModerator receive both; no other default role receives either. APPENDED AT THE END so every existing ordinal remains unchanged. The catalogue is regenerated from the enum. Consumers must re-pin; Identity must seed the approved default-role map, while grants for already-assigned principals remain a separately measured and authorized data change. Full prior notes remain in docs/CHANGELOG.md.