Xylocopadream.Otp.AspNetCore.Infrastructure 0.1.0

Xylocopadream.Otp.Authenticate

Passwordless OTP authentication server for ASP.NET Core: the user receives a code by e-mail, exchanges it for a JWT (identity claims only) and a refresh token.

Usage

builder.Services.AddAuthenticationServerDI(
    builder.Configuration,
    options => options.UseSqlite("Data Source=app.db"));

var app = builder.Build();

app.UseAuthenticationActivated()   // UseAuthentication + UseAuthorization + UseRateLimiter
   .UseCorrelationId();

app.MapAuthEndpoints<Program>();   // POST /auth/register, request-code, verify-code, refresh, logout
                                   // GET /.well-known/openid-configuration, /.well-known/jwks.json

Security

• OTP codes: cryptographically random, stored as HMAC-SHA256 (key derived from JwtSettings:SigningKey), valid 5 minutes, 5 attempts consumed atomically.
• Per email: at most one code per minute and 5 codes per hour (HTTP 429).
• Per client IP: 20 requests per minute on the /auth endpoints (HTTP 429). Behind a reverse proxy, configure ForwardedHeaders so the real client IP is used.
• Refresh tokens: stored as SHA-256 hashes, rotated atomically on each use. Presenting an already rotated token revokes every session of the user (theft detection).
• Expired data is purged every Otp:PurgeInterval (and at startup): OTP codes older than one hour, refresh tokens past their expiry. Revoked tokens are kept until they expire, so a replayed stolen token is still detected.
• Access tokens: signed with ES256 (ECDSA P-256). Only the OTP server holds the private key; consuming services validate with the public keys published at /.well-known/jwks.json (discovery: /.well-known/openid-configuration), so they cannot issue tokens. Only ES256 is accepted (no none, no HS256 confusion).
• One audience per service: the client names the service it asks tokens for (audience in POST /auth/verify-code), which must be listed in JwtSettings:Audiences; each service only accepts its own tokens. The refresh token keeps its audience, and removing a service from the list ends its sessions at their next renewal.

Key rotation: move the current key to JwtSettings:PreviousSigningKeys, set the new one in JwtSettings:SigningKey, restart. Services fetch the new key on the unknown kid; remove the old key once AccessTokenLifetime has elapsed. Pending OTP codes are invalidated (their HMAC key is derived from the signing key).

Configuration

Only JwtSettings:SigningKey, Issuer, Audiences, EmailSettings and Administration:Email are required; the values below are the defaults.

Create the signing key (ECDSA P-256, PEM) and keep it out of the repository:

key="$(openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey | openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt)"
dotnet user-secrets set "JwtSettings:SigningKey" "$key"

{
  "JwtSettings": {
    "SigningKey": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n...", "PreviousSigningKeys": [],
    "Issuer": "https://otp.example.com", "Audiences": [ "xylocopa", "billing-api" ],
    "AccessTokenLifetime": "00:15:00", "RefreshTokenLifetime": "30.00:00:00"
  },
  "Otp": {
    "CodeLifetime": "00:05:00", "MaxAttempts": 5,
    "MinDelayBetweenCodes": "00:01:00", "MaxCodesPerHour": 5,
    "RequestsPerMinutePerIp": 20,
    "PurgeInterval": "01:00:00"
  },
  "EmailSettings": { "Host": "smtp.example.com", "Port": 587, "Username": "", "Password": "", "FromEmail": "no-reply@example.com", "FromName": "OTP" },
  "Administration": { "Email": "admin@example.com" }
}

License

AGPL-3.0-or-later. If you run a modified version as a network service, you must offer its source code to its users.