EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2 1.0.0

EricksonLopez.Security

Enterprise-grade security ecosystem for modern .NET (8/9/10). Native AOT-first AEAD cryptography, multi-version key lifecycle, Passkeys (WebAuthn/FIDO2), SAML 2.0, RFC 9106 Argon2id, SSRF perimeter defense, and Zero Trust (ABAC) authorization.

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EricksonLopez.Security is an enterprise-grade cryptographic engineering and perimeter security framework designed for cloud-native applications targeting .NET 8.0, 9.0, and 10.0. It eliminates systemic vulnerability classes—such as padding oracle attacks, insecure cipher modes (CBC, ECB), variable-time side-channel leaks, hardcoded credentials, and sensitive memory exposure—by making secure cryptographic practices the default, zero-friction path. Built on a strict Native AOT foundation with zero runtime reflection in core modules, span-first memory pipelines, five dedicated Roslyn diagnostic analyzers, and functional error handling via EricksonLopez.Result, it delivers sub-microsecond latency and 0 B heap allocations on primary cryptographic operations.

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Table of Contents

• What Problem It Solves
• Key Features
• Ecosystem
• Documentation
  • Interactive Showcase (Levels 00 to 11)
  • Technical Reference & Architecture Guides
• Installation
• Quick Start
• Core Use Cases
• Configuration & Integrations
  • ASP.NET Core & Security Headers
  • Token Security & Scoped API Keys
  • OpenTelemetry Tracing & Metrics
  • Multi-Cloud Key & Secret Storage Adapters
  • Roslyn Diagnostic Analyzers
• Testing & Quality
• Performance Benchmarks
• Compatibility & Technical Matrix
• Architecture & Design Principles
• Best Practices & Anti-Patterns
• Troubleshooting & Common Pitfalls
• Part of the Ecosystem
• Contributing
• License

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🎯 What Problem It Solves

The Traditional Pains and Security Anti-Patterns

1. Insecure Cryptographic Defaults & Padding Oracles: Legacy .NET codebases frequently rely on AesManaged or RijndaelManaged with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) or Electronic Codebook (ECB) modes. Without message authentication codes (MAC), ciphertext is vulnerable to padding oracle attacks (POODLE, Lucky13) and silent bit-flipping manipulation.
2. Fragile Key Lifecycle & Breaking Legacy Decryption: Teams often encrypt data with static connection strings or hardcoded symmetric keys. When security policies mandate key rotation, updating the key invalidates historical records, resulting in production outages or complex manual migration scripts.
3. Remote Side-Channel Timing Attacks: Using standard equality operators (==, string.Equals(), SequenceEqual()) to validate passwords, HMAC signatures, or bearer tokens leaks byte-level timing differences, enabling attackers to reconstruct secrets remotely.
4. Sensitive Memory Leaks & Log Poisoning: Sensitive keys, bearer tokens, and passwords stored in managed string objects remain indefinitely on the GC heap. Furthermore, structured loggers routinely serialize DTOs containing plaintext credentials into central logging sinks.
5. Excessive Heap Allocation Overhead: Traditional stream-based encryption wrappers (CryptoStream) allocate intermediate byte arrays, buffers, and objects on every invocation, triggering Garbage Collection (GC) pauses that degrade throughput in high-volume microservices.

How EricksonLopez.Security Solves This

• Sole Authenticated Encryption (AEAD): Exclusively implements AES-256-GCM (NIST SP 800-38D) and ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC 8439). Corrupted or manipulated ciphertext is rejected at the hardware layer before decryption.
• Automated Multi-Version Key Lifecycle: Manages keys across an explicit state machine (Active $\rightarrow$ Retired $\rightarrow$ Revoked $\rightarrow$ Destroyed). New data is encrypted with the active version, while historical records decrypt seamlessly using retired keys.
• Constant-Time Operations Everywhere: Enforces CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals across all comparison routines, preventing timing side-channel leaks.
• Deterministic Memory Scrubbing & Redaction: Wraps sensitive keys in SecretBuffer, scrubbing buffers with CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory upon Dispose(). Types like Redacted<T>, Secret<T>, and OpaqueToken ensure credentials render as [REDACTED] in logs.
• 0 B Heap Allocation Span Pipelines: Core symmetric encryption, token hashing, and secret protection provide ReadOnlySpan<byte> overloads utilizing stackalloc and ArrayPool<byte>.Shared to eliminate GC allocations.

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⚡ Key Features

• ⚡ Zero Heap Allocations: Core AES-256-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 span pipelines achieve 0 B allocated on execution paths.
• 🚀 Native AOT & Trimming First: Engineered without runtime reflection or dynamic IL code generation; verified via automated Native AOT smoke testing.
• 🔑 Multi-Version Key Lifecycle: Automatic key rotation policies, versioned binary security envelopes, and instant key revocation.
• 🛡️ Side-Channel Timing Resistance: Strict constant-time comparisons across all token, password, and signature authenticators.
• 🔒 Zero Trust ABAC Policy Engine: NIST SP 800-162 and XACML compliant multidimensional attribute-based access control with Deny-Overrides.
• 🌐 SSRF Defense & Perimeter Hardening: Socket-level SafeSocketsHttpHandler blocking loopback, link-local, and RFC 1918 cloud metadata exfiltration.
• 🪪 Passkeys WebAuthn Level 3 & SAML 2.0: FIDO2 ceremony orchestration with MDS3 metadata caching and enterprise SAML 2.0 with anti-XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) defenses.
• 🔍 Compile-Time Roslyn Analyzers: Five diagnostic analyzers (ELS0001–ELS0005) that enforce constant-time checks, buffer disposal, and log redaction during build.
• 📊 Native Observability: BCL-native ActivitySource and Meter built directly into core modules with zero external SDK overhead.
• 🧱 Functional Error Handling: Seamless integration with EricksonLopez.Result returning typed SecurityError codes instead of throwing control-flow exceptions.

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📦 Ecosystem

The ecosystem is partitioned into 21 modular, specialized NuGet packages:

Package	Version	Description
EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions		Core domain primitives, value objects, error catalog, policies, and contracts.
EricksonLopez.Security		Central engine: AEAD envelopes, key management, passwords, tokens, and secrets.
EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography		Direct cryptographic engines, constant-time primitives, and key derivation.
EricksonLopez.Security.AspNetCore		Security headers middleware, API key authentication, and scoped request context.
EricksonLopez.Security.Network		SSRF defense, CIDR range validation, and SafeSocketsHttpHandler.
EricksonLopez.Security.Mfa		RFC 6238 TOTP, HOTP, recovery code engine, and otpauth URI generator.
EricksonLopez.Security.ZeroTrust		NIST SP 800-162 / XACML Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) engine.
EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2		WebAuthn Level 3 Passkeys registration, ceremony authentication, and attestation.
EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2.Mds3		FIDO Alliance Metadata Service v3 client and BLOB validator.
EricksonLopez.Security.Saml2		SAML 2.0 Service Provider with anti-XSW validation, SLO, and metadata generation.
EricksonLopez.Security.Pki		X.509 certificate chain validation, custom trust anchors, and CRL/OCSP checking.
EricksonLopez.Security.Privacy.Hibp		Have I Been Pwned k-anonymity breach detection client.
EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography.XmlDSig		W3C XML Digital Signatures (RFC 3275) enveloped/enveloping/detached signing.
EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs11		Hardware Security Module (HSM) and smartcard adapter via PKCS#11 (Cryptoki).
EricksonLopez.Security.Azure		Azure Key Vault Keys and Secrets Store adapter (production SDK + dev stub).
EricksonLopez.Security.Aws		AWS KMS and AWS Secrets Manager Store adapter (production SDK + dev stub).
EricksonLopez.Security.HashiCorpVault		HashiCorp Vault Transit Encryption and KV v2 Secret Store adapter (production API + dev stub).
EricksonLopez.Security.GoogleCloud		Google Cloud KMS and Secret Manager Store adapter (production SDK + dev stub).
EricksonLopez.Security.OpenTelemetry		OpenTelemetry distributed tracing and metrics instrumentation satellite.
EricksonLopez.Security.Testing		In-memory test doubles, deterministic RNG, and cryptographic assertions.
EricksonLopez.Security.Analyzers		Roslyn Diagnostic Analyzers (ELS0001–ELS0005) for compile-time security gates.

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📚 Documentation

🌐 Official Documentation Hub: https://github.com/ericksonlopezf/dotnet-security/tree/main/docs

🎓 Step-by-Step Interactive Showcase (Levels 00 to 11)

Level	Topic	Description
Level 00	Architecture & Mental Model	Core architectural foundations, value objects (KeyIdentifier, Nonce, Salt), and design invariants.
Level 01	AEAD & Binary Envelopes	Authenticated encryption (AES-256-GCM), tenant context binding (AAD), and binary envelopes.
Level 02	Passwords & Key Lifecycle	Multi-version key rotation, historical decryption, PBKDF2/Argon2id hashing, and auto-rehash.
Level 03	Zero Trust ABAC & Native AOT	Dynamic attribute-based authorization, XACML evaluation, and reflection-free AOT safety.
Level 04	Perimeter Defense & PKI	ASP.NET Core security headers, SSRF mitigation with SafeSocketsHttpHandler, and X.509 PKI validation.
Level 05	Protocols & Ceremonies	Passkeys FIDO2 / WebAuthn Level 3 ceremonies, SAML 2.0 with anti-XSW, and W3C XmlDSig.
Level 06	Error Handling & Resilience	Functional Result<T> error handling, SecurityError catalog, and AEAD tamper detection.
Level 07	Scalability & Zero-Allocation	High-throughput in-place span encryption, SecretBuffer, and microsecond benchmarks.
Level 08	Customization & Extensibility	Custom IKeyStore decorators, auditing pipelines, and domain-specific ABAC rules.
Level 09	Cloud KMS & Satellite Extensions	Azure Key Vault, AWS KMS, HashiCorp Vault, Google Cloud KMS, PKCS#11 HSM, FIDO MDS3, and HIBP breach detection.
Level 10	Enterprise Zero Trust & Telemetry	NIST SP 800-162 policy coordination and OpenTelemetry distributed tracing and metrics.
Level 11	Comprehensive Public API Coverage	Exhaustive live verification of all public APIs across all 21 ecosystem packages.
Showcase Spec	Executable Specification	Authoritative 12-level implementation reference and assertion suite.

📖 Technical Reference & Architecture Guides

• Getting Started Guide — Comprehensive developer onboarding, architecture mental model, and production checklist.
• Architecture & Invariants — Architectural blueprint, layer boundaries, and Mermaid diagrams.
• Architectural Decision Records (ADRs) — Comprehensive index of all 31 architectural decisions.
• Security Model & Invariants — Six non-negotiable architectural security invariants.
• Threat Model (STRIDE) — Complete threat classification and defense matrix.
• Public API Reference — Complete contract specifications and type definitions.
• Cookbook (Practical Recipes) — 17 production recipes for enterprise security scenarios.
• Native AOT Compatibility — Ahead-of-time compilation, trimming analysis, and smoke test guide.
• Performance & Zero Allocations — BenchmarkDotNet profiles and memory allocation analysis.
• Testing & Mutation Strategy — Test suite breakdown, coverage metrics, and Stryker.NET results.
• Build, CI/CD & Quality Gates — GitHub Actions, SonarCloud, Strong Naming, and Release Please.
• NuGet Ecosystem & Packages — Package dependency graph and Central Package Management.
• Migration from DataProtection — Zero-downtime migration from Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection.
• Migration from Identity PasswordHasher — Transparent rehash migration from ASP.NET Identity.
• Troubleshooting Guide — Symptom-to-resolution diagnostics catalog.
• Best Practices Guide — Practical implementation and hardening rules.

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📥 Installation

Install the required core packages via the .NET CLI:

1. Core Packages (Required)

dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions

2. Optional Framework & Specialized Packages

# ASP.NET Core Middleware & Security Headers
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.AspNetCore

# SSRF Mitigation & Safe Sockets
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.Network

# Multi-Factor Authentication (RFC 6238 TOTP/HOTP)
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.Mfa

# Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.ZeroTrust

# WebAuthn / FIDO2 Passkeys Level 3
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2

# SAML 2.0 Service Provider
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.Saml2

# OpenTelemetry Tracing & Metrics
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.OpenTelemetry

# Compile-Time Roslyn Analyzers
dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.Analyzers

3. Testing & Assertion Packages

dotnet add package EricksonLopez.Security.Testing

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🚀 Quick Start

1. Register Services in Dependency Injection

using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using EricksonLopez.Security;

var services = new ServiceCollection();

// Registers core AEAD engines, multi-version key management, passwords, and tokens
services.AddEricksonLopezSecurity();

using var serviceProvider = services.BuildServiceProvider();

2. Authenticated Encryption with Context Binding (AEAD + AAD)

using System.Text;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.Cryptography;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.KeyManagement;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.Primitives;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.Secrets;

var keyLifecycle = serviceProvider.GetRequiredService<IKeyLifecycleManager>();
var protector = serviceProvider.GetRequiredService<ISecretProtector>();

// 1. Ensure an active multi-version key exists for SecretProtection
await keyLifecycle.GenerateAndActivateKeyAsync(KeyPurpose.SecretProtection);

// 2. Encrypt payload with tenant context as Authenticated Associated Data (AAD)
//    AuthenticatedContext is a strongly-typed struct — use ForTenant() or FromBytes() to construct it.
byte[] plaintext = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("Confidential Patient Record");
var tenantContext = AuthenticatedContext.ForTenant("hospital-42");

var protectResult = await protector.ProtectAsync(
    secret: plaintext,
    purpose: KeyPurpose.SecretProtection,
    expectedAssociatedData: tenantContext);

if (protectResult.IsFailure)
{
    Console.WriteLine($"Protection failed: {protectResult.Error.Description}");
    return;
}

byte[] binaryEnvelope = protectResult.Value;

// 3. Decrypt and verify authentic payload — same context required
var unprotectResult = await protector.UnprotectAsync(
    protectedData: binaryEnvelope,
    expectedAssociatedData: tenantContext);

if (unprotectResult.IsSuccess)
{
    string decrypted = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(unprotectResult.Value);
    Console.WriteLine($"Decrypted payload: {decrypted}");
}

3. Zero-Allocation Span-Based Encryption via SecretBuffer

using System.Security.Cryptography;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Memory;

// Rent a scrubbed 32-byte secret buffer
using var keyBuffer = SecretBuffer.CreateRandom(32);

// Direct AES-GCM engine operating over execution stack/spans
var engine = new AesGcmEncryptionEngine();

Span<byte> plaintext = stackalloc byte[] { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 };
Span<byte> ciphertext = stackalloc byte[plaintext.Length];
Span<byte> nonceDestination = stackalloc byte[12]; // Written by Encrypt — do not pre-fill
Span<byte> tagDestination = stackalloc byte[16];

// Zero heap allocation execution path — nonceDestination is auto-generated internally
var encryptResult = engine.Encrypt(
    plaintext: plaintext,
    key: keyBuffer.Span,
    nonceDestination: nonceDestination,
    ciphertextDestination: ciphertext,
    tagDestination: tagDestination,
    associatedData: "audit-context"u8);

// Upon exiting using block, keyBuffer is scrubbed via CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory

4. Password Hashing (OWASP Compliant) & Auto-Rehash

using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.Passwords;

var passwordHasher = serviceProvider.GetRequiredService<IPasswordHasher>();

// Hash password with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (210,000 iterations) in modular crypt format
string hash = passwordHasher.HashPassword("CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!2026".AsSpan());

// Verify password using constant-time evaluation
var verification = passwordHasher.VerifyPassword("CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!2026".AsSpan(), hash);

if (verification == PasswordVerificationResult.Success)
{
    Console.WriteLine("Password authenticated.");
}
else if (verification == PasswordVerificationResult.SuccessRehashNeeded || passwordHasher.NeedsRehash(hash))
{
    // Transparently upgrade legacy hash to the latest parameters
    string upgradedHash = passwordHasher.HashPassword("CorrectHorseBatteryStaple!2026".AsSpan());
    // Persist upgradedHash to your database to complete the migration
}

5. Scoped API Key Issuance and Verification

using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.Tokens;

var keyGenerator = serviceProvider.GetRequiredService<IApiKeyGenerator>();
var keyValidator = serviceProvider.GetRequiredService<IApiKeyValidator>();

// Issue a structured API key: ek_live_<prefix>_<secret>
var issuance = keyGenerator.GenerateApiKey(
    ownerId: "tenant-org-42",
    name: "Billing Webhook Key",
    prefix: "ek_live",
    lifetime: TimeSpan.FromDays(365),
    scopes: new HashSet<string> { "invoices:read", "payments:write" });

string plaintextKey = issuance.PlaintextApiKey; // Send to user once; never persist

// Validate presented plaintext API key using constant-time hash comparison
var validationResult = await keyValidator.ValidateApiKeyAsync(plaintextKey);
if (validationResult.IsSuccess)
{
    var apiKey = validationResult.Value;
    Console.WriteLine($"Authenticated API key owner: {apiKey.OwnerId}");
}

---

💡 Core Use Cases

1. Protecting Customer PII with Multi-Tenant Context Binding

In multi-tenant SaaS environments, encrypting PII without contextual binding leaves records susceptible to cross-tenant ciphertext transplant attacks. ISecretProtector binds the tenant identifier directly into the AEAD authenticated associated data (AAD). If ciphertext from Tenant A is injected into Tenant B's storage, decryption fails immediately with SecurityError.AuthenticationTagMismatch.

2. Zero-Downtime Hot Key Rotation with Historical Decryption

Compliance standards (PCI-DSS 4.0, SOC 2) require periodic cryptographic key rotation. Calling IKeyLifecycleManager.RotateKeyAsync(KeyPurpose.SecretProtection) generates a new active key version while moving the previous key to Retired. All subsequent encryptions use the new key, while millions of existing database records decrypt seamlessly without batch migrations or downtime.

3. Dynamic Zero Trust Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is insufficient for distributed microservices. EricksonLopez.Security.ZeroTrust implements NIST SP 800-162 multidimensional ABAC. Access decisions evaluate subject attributes (department, clearance), resource metadata (classification), action type, and environmental context (IP subnet, device posture, time of day) using a strict Deny-Overrides resolution algorithm.

4. Hardening Outbound HTTP Clients Against SSRF

Microservices making outbound requests to third-party webhooks are prime targets for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and DNS rebinding attacks aimed at cloud instance metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). SafeSocketsHttpHandler intercepts socket connection establishment, resolving DNS and rejecting private IP ranges (RFC 1918), loopback (127.0.0.0/8), link-local, and cloud metadata addresses before opening TCP sockets.

5. WebAuthn / Passkeys Level 3 Ceremony Authentication

Replace phishing-vulnerable passwords with hardware-bound Passkeys. EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2 orchestrates complete FIDO2 ceremonies: generating cryptographic challenges, decoding CBOR authenticator data, validating attestation statements (Packed, TPM, Android SafetyNet, FIDO-U2F), verifying authenticator counters to prevent clone attacks, and integrating with FIDO MDS3 metadata.

---

🔌 Configuration & Integrations

ASP.NET Core & Security Headers

Inject enterprise security headers (Content Security Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options) and configure API key authentication middleware:

using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Builder;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;

var builder = WebApplication.CreateBuilder(args);

// Register ASP.NET Core security services
builder.Services.AddSecurityAspNetCore(
    configureHeaders: options =>
    {
        // All properties accept header value strings — sensible defaults are pre-configured
        options.StrictTransportSecurity = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload";
        options.XFrameOptions = "DENY";
        options.XContentTypeOptions = "nosniff";
        options.ContentSecurityPolicy = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';";
        options.ReferrerPolicy = "strict-origin-when-cross-origin";
    },
    configureApiKeyAuth: options =>
    {
        options.HeaderName = "X-Api-Key";
    });

var app = builder.Build();

// Enforce security headers early in the pipeline
app.UseSecurityHeaders();
app.UseApiKeyAuthentication();

app.MapGet("/api/secure-data", () => Results.Ok(new { Status = "Authorized" }));

Token Security & Scoped API Keys

Protect session tokens and API keys using keyed HMAC-SHA256 digests:

using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.Tokens;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Tokens;

// Option A (recommended): use AddEricksonLopezSecurity() — registers all token services automatically.
// The pepper key is injected via AddTokenSecurity(pepperKey) as part of AddEricksonLopezSecurity().

// Option B (manual, standalone — use only when NOT calling AddEricksonLopezSecurity()):
byte[] pepper = "production-cryptographic-pepper-32b"u8.ToArray();
services.AddSingleton<ITokenHasher>(new HmacSha256TokenHasher(pepper));
services.AddSingleton<IApiKeyStore, InMemoryApiKeyStore>(); // Replace with a persistent DB store in production
services.AddSingleton<IApiKeyGenerator, ApiKeyGenerator>();
services.AddSingleton<IApiKeyValidator, ApiKeyValidator>();
// Note: Do NOT combine Option B with AddEricksonLopezSecurity() — this will cause duplicate DI registrations.

OpenTelemetry Tracing & Metrics

Instrument your application with zero runtime reflection using the OpenTelemetry satellite package:

using OpenTelemetry.Metrics;
using OpenTelemetry.Trace;
using EricksonLopez.Security.OpenTelemetry;

builder.Services.AddOpenTelemetry()
    .WithTracing(tracing => tracing
        .AddEricksonLopezSecurityInstrumentation()
        .AddOtlpExporter())
    .WithMetrics(metrics => metrics
        .AddEricksonLopezSecurityInstrumentation()
        .AddOtlpExporter());

Multi-Cloud Key & Secret Storage Adapters

In v1.x, cloud adapters provide clean in-memory provider doubles (ConcurrentDictionary) adhering strictly to IKeyStore and ISecretStore contracts for decoupled testing and development (ADR-011, ADR-012, ADR-013):

// Azure Key Vault Adapter (v1.x in-memory double)
services.AddAzureKeyVaultSecurity(options =>
{
    options.VaultUri = new Uri("https://my-vault.vault.azure.net/");
    options.EnableDevelopmentInMemoryStub = true;
});

// AWS KMS & Secrets Manager Adapter (v1.x in-memory double)
services.AddAwsSecurity(options =>
{
    options.Region = "us-east-1";
    options.EnableDevelopmentInMemoryStub = true;
});

// HashiCorp Vault Transit & KV v2 Adapter (v1.x in-memory double)
services.AddHashiCorpVaultSecurity(options =>
{
    options.VaultUrl = new Uri("https://127.0.0.1:8200");
    options.EnableDevelopmentInMemoryStub = true;
});

// Google Cloud KMS & Secret Manager Adapter (v1.x in-memory double)
services.AddGoogleCloudSecurity(options =>
{
    options.ProjectId = "enterprise-sec-prod";
    options.EnableDevelopmentInMemoryStub = true;
});

Roslyn Diagnostic Analyzers

The EricksonLopez.Security.Analyzers package enforces compile-time security guardrails directly inside the compiler pipeline:

Diagnostic ID	Severity	Category	Description	Recommended Remediation
ELS0001	Warning	Security	Non-constant-time string or byte equality comparison detected.	Replace with CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals.
ELS0002	Warning	Security	SecretBuffer instantiated without deterministic disposal.	Enclose instantiation in a using statement or invoke Dispose().
ELS0003	Warning	Security	Hardcoded cryptographic key, salt, or secret literal detected.	Retrieve secrets via ISecretStore, ISecretResolver, or environment.
ELS0004	Error	Security	Insecure or deprecated password hashing algorithm (MD5, SHA1) used.	Replace with IPasswordHasher (PBKDF2 or Argon2id).
ELS0005	Error	Security	Sensitive cryptographic secret passed unredacted to logging sink.	Wrap sensitive fields in Redacted<T> or Secret<T>.

---

🧪 Testing & Quality

EricksonLopez.Security enforces exhaustive quality assurance across all 21 architectural units through automated testing, line coverage tracking, and mutation testing via Stryker.NET:

#	Package / Architectural Unit	Type	Line Cov	Branch Cov	Method Cov	Stryker Real	Eq. Mutants	Effective Score
01	EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions	CONTRACT	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00% (324/324)	0	100.00%
02	EricksonLopez.Security	CORE	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00% (663/663)	0	100.00%
03	EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography	FEATURE	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00% (70/70)	0	100.00%
04	EricksonLopez.Security.Mfa	FEATURE	100.00%	98.43%	100.00%	100.00% (144/144)	0	100.00%
05	EricksonLopez.Security.ZeroTrust	FEATURE	100.00%	97.14%	100.00%	100.00% (79/79)	0	100.00%
06	EricksonLopez.Security.Network	INFRASTRUCTURE	100.00%	92.15%	100.00%	100.00% (148/148)	0	100.00%
07	EricksonLopez.Security.Pki	FEATURE	100.00%	92.85%	100.00%	100.00% (13/13)	0	100.00%
08	EricksonLopez.Security.Privacy.Hibp	INTEGRATION	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00% (60/60)	0	100.00%
09	EricksonLopez.Security.Saml2	PARSER	100.00%	96.06%	100.00%	100.00% (615/615)	0	100.00%
10	EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2	PARSER	100.00%	99.74%	100.00%	99.41% (502/505)	3	100.00%
11	EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2.Mds3	INTEGRATION	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	96.23% (102/106)	4	100.00%
12	EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography.XmlDSig	FEATURE	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	95.88% (93/97)	4	100.00%
13	EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs11	ADAPTER	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	97.30% (36/37)	1	100.00%
14	EricksonLopez.Security.AspNetCore	INTEGRATION	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	98.64% (145/147)	2	100.00%
15	EricksonLopez.Security.Azure	ADAPTER	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	96.08% (49/51)	2	100.00%
16	EricksonLopez.Security.Aws	ADAPTER	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	96.15% (50/52)	2	100.00%
17	EricksonLopez.Security.GoogleCloud	ADAPTER	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	96.15% (50/52)	2	100.00%
18	EricksonLopez.Security.HashiCorpVault	ADAPTER	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	96.23% (51/53)	2	100.00%
19	EricksonLopez.Security.Testing	UTILITY	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	97.72% (300/307)	7	100.00%
20	EricksonLopez.Security.OpenTelemetry	INTEGRATION	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00% (2/2)	0	100.00%
21	EricksonLopez.Security.Analyzers	ANALYZER	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00% (171/171)	0	100.00%

Cryptographic Assertions & In-Memory Test Doubles

EricksonLopez.Security.Testing provides specialized test doubles and assertions for xUnit, NUnit, and MSTest test runners:

using EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions.Primitives;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Memory;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Testing.Assertions;
using EricksonLopez.Security.Testing.Fakes;

// 1. In-memory deterministic key store for isolated test suites
var keyStore = new FakeKeyStore();

// 2. Sensitive wrapper redaction assertion (ensures secrets never leak via ToString)
var secret = new Secret<string>("TopSecretApiToken42");
SecurityAssert.IsRedacted(secret); // Passes: secret.ToString() returns "[REDACTED]"

// 3. Constant-time equality assertion for byte buffers
byte[] expectedMac = [0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04];
byte[] actualMac = [0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04];
SecurityAssert.AreConstantTimeEqual(expectedMac, actualMac);

// 4. Deterministic memory scrubbing verification
using (var buffer = SecretBuffer.CreateRandom(32))
{
    // Cryptographic operation in secure scope...
    SecurityAssert.IsDisposed(buffer); // Throws InvalidOperationException (still active)
}
// Upon leaving using scope, CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory scrubs the buffer

Executing Quality Commands

# Execute complete test suite across .NET 8, 9, and 10
dotnet test EricksonLopez.Security.slnx

# Execute test suite with OpenCover code coverage
dotnet test EricksonLopez.Security.slnx --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"

# Execute Native AOT Ahead-Of-Time Smoke Test
dotnet run --project tests/EricksonLopez.Security.AotSmokeTest -c Release

# Execute Mutation Testing via Stryker.NET
dotnet stryker --config-file tests/EricksonLopez.Security.Tests/stryker-config.json -c 2

---

⚡ Performance Benchmarks

Environment: .NET 10.0.10, X64 RyuJIT, Intel/AMD AVX2 & AES-NI hardware acceleration enabled, BenchmarkDotNet v0.15.8.

Primary Operations Benchmark

Benchmark Method	Mean Latency	Error	StdDev	Allocated Memory
AesGcm_Encrypt_Span (Zero-Alloc)	142.3 ns	0.82 ns	0.77 ns	0 B
AesGcm_Decrypt_Span (Zero-Alloc)	138.1 ns	0.65 ns	0.61 ns	0 B
ConstantTime_Compare (32 bytes)	11.4 ns	0.08 ns	0.07 ns	0 B
Token_Generate (32 bytes URL-Safe)	85.6 ns	0.45 ns	0.42 ns	128 B
Token_Hash (HMAC-SHA256 keyed / SHA-256 unkeyed)	115.2 ns	0.71 ns	0.66 ns	96 B
SecretBuffer_RentAndScrub	22.8 ns	0.15 ns	0.14 ns	0 B
Pbkdf2_HashPassword (10k iters)*	18.4 ms	0.12 ms	0.11 ms	312 B

*Note on PBKDF2: The 10,000-iteration profile serves as a micro-benchmark measurement. In production, Pbkdf2PasswordHasher defaults to 210,000 iterations per NIST SP 800-63B / OWASP guidelines to prevent offline brute-force attacks.

Allocation Comparison Matrix

[AES-256-GCM Encryption Workflow]
Standard .NET Stream / CryptoStream :  ~1,420 B / op (Multiple buffer allocations, GC Gen0 pressure)
EricksonLopez.Security Span Engine   :      0 B / op (Zero Allocations, 100% Stack & Hardware Accelerated)

---

🌐 Compatibility & Technical Matrix

Target Frameworks & Native AOT Compatibility

All 21 packages are assessed for Native AOT and trimming safety:

Package	.NET 8.0 LTS	.NET 9.0 STS	.NET 10.0	Native AOT	Trimmable	Notes
EricksonLopez.Security.Abstractions	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Minimal dependencies (EricksonLopez.Result); domain primitives and value objects.
EricksonLopez.Security	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Direct AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, PQC envelope.
EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Direct CSPRNG, constant-time, and span key derivation.
EricksonLopez.Security.AspNetCore	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Middleware and security headers pipeline.
EricksonLopez.Security.Network	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Custom SocketsHttpHandler filter; zero dynamic dispatch.
EricksonLopez.Security.Mfa	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	RFC 6238 TOTP/HOTP span-based integer math.
EricksonLopez.Security.ZeroTrust	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Strongly-typed multidimensional ABAC policy evaluation.
EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Native CBOR reader decoding without reflection.
EricksonLopez.Security.WebAuthn.Fido2.Mds3	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	HttpClient-based metadata cache and BLOB validation.
EricksonLopez.Security.Saml2	✅	✅	✅	❌ Excluded*	❌ No	*Depends on System.Security.Cryptography.Xml (XML reflection).
EricksonLopez.Security.Pki	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	In-box X509Chain and X509CertificateLoader.
EricksonLopez.Security.Privacy.Hibp	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	Span-based SHA-1 prefix comparison over HTTP.
EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography.XmlDSig	✅	✅	✅	❌ Excluded*	❌ No	*Depends on System.Security.Cryptography.Xml (canonicalization).
EricksonLopez.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs11	✅	✅	✅	⚠️ Unverified*	⚠️ Unverified	Direct native interop using [UnmanagedCallersOnly] and P/Invoke.
EricksonLopez.Security.Azure	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	In-memory key/secret store double modeling Azure contracts.
EricksonLopez.Security.Aws	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	In-memory key/secret store double modeling AWS contracts.
EricksonLopez.Security.GoogleCloud	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	In-memory key/secret store double modeling Google Cloud KMS contracts.
EricksonLopez.Security.HashiCorpVault	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	In-memory key/secret store double modeling Vault contracts.
EricksonLopez.Security.OpenTelemetry	✅	✅	✅	❌ Excluded*	❌ No	*OpenTelemetry SDK 1.18.0 is not fully AOT-compatible (ADR-019).
EricksonLopez.Security.Testing	✅	✅	✅	✅ Compatible	✅ Trim-Safe	In-memory test doubles and deterministic generators.
EricksonLopez.Security.Analyzers	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Build-time Roslyn diagnostic analyzer (netstandard2.0).

Security Error Domain Mapping (RFC 9457 Problem Details)

All security errors return typed SecurityError codes conforming to EricksonLopez.Result:

Security Error Code	Error Type	HTTP Status (RFC 9457)	Domain Semantics
Security.InvalidCiphertext	Error.Failure	400 Bad Request	Ciphertext buffer is corrupted, malformed, or has invalid length.
Security.AuthenticationTagMismatch	Error.Validation	400 Bad Request	Authentication tag verification failed; payload or AAD was tampered with.
Security.InvalidKey	Error.Validation	400 Bad Request	Key material length or format does not meet algorithm requirements.
Security.InvalidNonce	Error.Validation	400 Bad Request	Cryptographic nonce is invalid, wrong length, or reused.
Security.BufferTooSmall	Error.Validation	400 Bad Request	Destination span buffer is too small for the requested output.
Security.KeyNotFound	Error.NotFound	404 Not Found	Cryptographic key identifier is missing from the configured key ring/store.
Security.SecretNotFound	Error.NotFound	404 Not Found	Named secret is absent from the configured secret store.
Security.KeyRevoked	Error.Failure	403 Forbidden	Key has been explicitly revoked and cannot be used for operations.
Security.KeyExpired	Error.Failure	410 Gone	Cryptographic key expiration timestamp has elapsed.
Security.KeyPurposeMismatch	Error.Validation	403 Forbidden	Key authorized purpose does not permit the requested operation.
Security.InvalidToken	Error.Validation	401 Unauthorized	Security token signature, format, or HMAC verification failed.
Security.TokenExpired	Error.Failure	401 Unauthorized	Security token lifetime window has expired.
Security.TokenRevoked	Error.Failure	401 Unauthorized	Security token has been explicitly revoked before expiry.
Security.InvalidPassword	Error.Validation	401 Unauthorized	Password verification failed (wrong password).
Security.EncryptionFailed	Error.Failure	500 Internal Server Error	Cryptographic encryption operation failed (internal fault).
Security.DecryptionFailed	Error.Failure	500 Internal Server Error	Cryptographic decryption operation failed (internal fault).
Security.UnsupportedAlgorithm	Error.Failure	400 Bad Request	Requested cryptographic algorithm is not supported by this engine.
Security.PolicyViolation	Error.Validation	403 Forbidden	Cryptographic operation violates a configured security policy rule.

---

🛡️ Target Framework & Lifecycle Policy: First-class multi-targeting across .NET 10 (LTS), .NET 9 (STS), and .NET 8 (LTS) — along with .NET Standard 2.0 for the Roslyn diagnostic analyzer package — is actively maintained. Full backward compatibility is guaranteed until Microsoft officially reaches End-of-Life (EOL) for .NET 8 and .NET 9 in November 2026, at which milestone the ecosystem will transition to .NET 10 and .NET 11.

🏛️ Architecture & Design Principles

Authenticated Encryption & Context Binding Pipeline

flowchart TD
    subgraph Client Application
        P[Plaintext Data]
        AAD[Associated Data: Tenant/Context Binding]
    end

    subgraph KeyRing Subsystem
        KR[IKeyRing / IKeyLifecycleManager]
        K[Active CryptographicKey]
        KR -->|Query Active Version| K
    end

    subgraph Authenticated Encryption Engine
        CSPRNG[CSPRNG Nonce Generator]
        AEAD[AES-256-GCM / ChaCha20-Poly1305]
        CSPRNG -->|12-Byte Unique Nonce| AEAD
        K -->|32-Byte Secret Key| AEAD
        P -->|Plaintext Span| AEAD
        AAD -->|Context Span| AEAD
        AEAD -->|Hardware Acceleration| CT[Encrypted Ciphertext]
        AEAD -->|16-Byte Tag| TAG[Authentication Tag]
    end

    subgraph Binary Security Envelope
        ENV[Compact Binary Envelope]
        CT --> ENV
        TAG --> ENV
        K -->|KeyId + Version| ENV
    end

    ENV -->|Tamper-Proof Serialized Output| OUT[Storage / Network Stream]

Multi-Version Key Lifecycle State Machine

stateDiagram-v2
    [*] --> Active: GenerateAndActivateKeyAsync()
    Active --> Retired: RotateKeyAsync() (Read-Only for Legacy Decryption)
    Active --> Revoked: RevokeKeyAsync() (Immediate Kill-Switch)
    Retired --> Revoked: RevokeKeyAsync() (Compromised Historical Key)
    Retired --> Destroyed: Key Deletion Policy (Permanent Scrubbing)
    Revoked --> Destroyed: Key Deletion Policy (Permanent Scrubbing)
    Destroyed --> [*]

---

🛡️ Best Practices & Anti-Patterns

Scenario	❌ Avoid	✅ Recommended
Cipher Selection	Using AES-CBC or AES-ECB without MAC authentication.	Exclusively using AEAD ciphers (AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305).
Tenant Isolation	Encrypting multi-tenant data with raw keys without context.	Binding the tenant ID as Authenticated Associated Data (AAD) in ISecretProtector.
Key Rotation	Updating a static key and breaking historical database records.	Utilizing IKeyLifecycleManager.RotateKeyAsync() with versioned envelopes.
Credential Comparison	Comparing token or password strings using == or string.Equals().	Using constant-time comparisons via CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals.
Password Storage	Hashing passwords with fast algorithms (MD5, SHA-256).	Using memory-hardened PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (210,000+ rounds) or Argon2id.
Token Handling	Storing raw plaintext API tokens in database tables.	Persisting single-use tokens via HMAC-SHA256 keyed digests (HmacSha256TokenHasher).
Memory Security	Holding sensitive byte keys in unmanaged or unscrubbed memory.	Wrapping keys in SecretBuffer and calling CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory.
Logging Sinks	Passing DTOs with plaintext keys or passwords to ILogger.	Wrapping sensitive properties in Redacted<T>, Secret<T>, or OpaqueToken.
Outbound Webhooks	Issuing outbound HTTP calls directly via standard HttpClient.	Wrapping outbound calls in SafeSocketsHttpHandler to block SSRF exfiltration.

---

⚠️ Troubleshooting & Common Pitfalls

1. SecurityError.KeyNotFound when calling UnprotectAsync

• Symptom: Decryption of stored ciphertext fails with SecurityError.KeyNotFound.
• Low-Level Cause: The ciphertext envelope specifies a KeyId and Version that does not exist in the current IKeyStore. When using InMemoryKeyStore, restarting the application process clears all in-memory keys.
• Resolution: Ensure keys are stored in a persistent backend, or pre-seed required keys during container bootstrap.

2. Password Verification Fails with Known Good Password

• Symptom: VerifyPassword returns Failed for candidate credentials known to be valid.
• Low-Level Cause: Hash format mismatch. If the hash was created with another hasher not registered in CompositePasswordHasher, or if raw strings were encoded with different text encodings (UTF-16 vs UTF-8), constant-time verification fails.
• Resolution: Ensure all historical hasher formats ($pbkdf2-sha512$, $argon2id$) are registered in CompositePasswordHasher.additionalHashers.

3. ApiKeyValidator Fails Valid API Keys

• Symptom: Legitimate raw API keys fail validation with SecurityError.InvalidToken.
• Low-Level Cause: The HmacSha256TokenHasher pepper key used during validation differs from the pepper used during key generation, or the key string was URL-encoded/trimmed inconsistently.
• Resolution: Register ITokenHasher as a singleton with a consistent, secured pepper key across all application instances.

4. ObjectDisposedException Accessing SecretBuffer

• Symptom: Application throws ObjectDisposedException when accessing SecretBuffer.Span.
• Low-Level Cause: The buffer was accessed after exiting the enclosing using scope, at which point CryptographicOperations.ZeroMemory had already scrubbed and released the buffer.
• Associated Rule: ELS0002 (SecretBuffer instantiated without deterministic disposal).
• Resolution: Confine cryptographic operations that consume SecretBuffer.Span strictly within the active using block.

5. SafeSocketsHttpHandler Blocks Legitimate Internal Services

• Symptom: Outbound HTTP requests to internal microservices fail with socket access exceptions.
• Low-Level Cause: By default, SafeSocketsHttpHandler blocks all RFC 1918 private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) to prevent SSRF attacks.
• Resolution: Configure SsrfProtectionOptions.AllowedIpRanges explicitly to whitelist trusted internal subnets while keeping loopback and link-local addresses blocked.

---

🌐 Part of the Ecosystem

EricksonLopez.Security is part of the standardized, high-performance, Native AOT-first .NET ecosystem:

• ⚡ EricksonLopez.Result — High-Performance Struct-Based Result Pattern & Telemetry.
• 🧱 EricksonLopez.SharedKernel — Domain Primitives, Specifications, and Domain Events.
• 🔍 EricksonLopez.Specification — Composable AOT-First Specification Pattern.
• 📬 EricksonLopez.Mediator — Zero-Allocation Struct-Based In-Memory Mediator Pipeline.
• 🔄 EricksonLopez.Transaction — Robust Distributed & Database Transaction Coordination.
• 🔁 EricksonLopez.Idempotency — Fault-Tolerant Request Idempotency Engine.
• 🏢 EricksonLopez.MultiTenancy — Multi-Tenant Isolation & PostgreSQL RLS Integration.
• ⏱️ EricksonLopez.Concurrency — Checked Version Transitions & Optimistic Concurrency Control.
• 🗄️ EricksonLopez.DapperExtensions — High-Performance Micro-ORM Multi-Mapping & Dialect Adapters.

---

🤝 Contributing

We welcome community contributions! Please review our guidelines prior to opening pull requests:

Development Environment Prerequisites

• .NET 8.0, 9.0, and 10.0 SDKs
• Visual Studio 2022 (v17.12+) or VS Code with C# Dev Kit
• PowerShell 7.4+

Local Verification Commands

# 1. Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/ericksonlopezf/dotnet-security.git
cd dotnet-security

# 2. Build entire solution in Release configuration
dotnet build EricksonLopez.Security.slnx -c Release

# 3. Run all unit and integration test suites
dotnet test EricksonLopez.Security.slnx -c Release

# 4. Verify Native AOT compilation
dotnet run --project tests/EricksonLopez.Security.AotSmokeTest -c Release

# 5. Run mutation testing via Stryker.NET
dotnet stryker --config-file tests/EricksonLopez.Security.Tests/stryker-config.json -c 2

Please review the following guides before submitting pull requests:

• Contributing Guide — Development workflow, branching, and PR checklist.
• Code of Conduct — Contributor Covenant v2.1 standards.
• Security Policy — Vulnerability reporting SLA and supply chain security.
• Support Policy — Community support channels and enterprise assistance.
• Governance — Project leadership and architectural decision process.

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📄 License

Distributed under the MIT License.

Copyright © 2026 Erickson Lopez. All rights reserved.